The distinction between actus humanus and actus hominis is the best-known distinction in Thomas Aquinas’ theory of action. A human action (actus humanus) is a special case of an act of a human being (actus hominis). Several acts of our intellect and will form a human action and thereby put it from the realm of pure natural happenings (genus naturae) into the moral realm (genus moris). The paper at hand shows the character and main parameters of Thomas Aquinas’ action theory, (...) especially in the Summa theologiae I-II, quaestiones 6-17. Moreover, it presents Thomas Aquinas’ central idea of what is the essence of a human action. The analysis especially makes use of the element of command (imperium) It shows that, according to Aquinas, acting consists in the intellectually comprehensible self-disclosure of a person and therefore builds the basis for the moral evaluation of human actions. (shrink)

RESUMO Ainda que Tomás de Aquino não usasse o termo intencionalidade frequentemente, ele tem uma teoria que explica como nós, enquanto sujeitos, nos referimos intencionalmente aos objetos. Nossa referência funciona quando há uma "identidade formal" entre a forma no ato de percepção ou conhecimento do sujeito e a forma do objeto. Na literatura secundária, "identidade formal" é muitas vezes o nome usado para chamar essa teoria. Nosso artigo visa o fato de que, em Tomás, a tese da identidade formal não (...) é só epistemológica, mas ela exige uma base metafísico-ontológica. O resultado da nossa investigação é que, segundo a tese da identidade formal, a referência epistêmica aos objetos funciona de maneira direta, mas por meio disso ela não produz uma variedade de objetos imanentes ou intencionais na ontologia. ABSTRACT Even if Thomas Aquinas did not use the term intentionality often, He has a theory that explains how we, as subjects, intentionally refer to objects. Our reference works when there is a "formal identity" between the form in the act of perception or subject knowledge and the form of the object. In secondary literature, "formal identity" is the name used to refer to that theory. Our article aims at the fact that, in Thomas's writings, the formal identity thesis is not only epistemological, but requires a metaphysical-ontological basis. The result of our investigation is that, according to the formal identity thesis, the epistemic reference to objects works on a direct way, but by means of that it does not produce a variety of immanent or intentional objects within ontology. (shrink)